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Introduction
South America has a wealth of diverse energy resources,' but its
nations have had difficulty maximizing these resources within and across
t Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2012; B.A., Ryerson University, 2007.
First of all, I would like to thank Elise Simbro and John Errico for their hard work editing
this note. A special thanks is due Melissa Gallo for her unconditional support
throughout law school. I also owe a great deal of thanks to my friends at Stewart Avenue
and my friends from Syracuse. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my
mother for her undying support and love throughout my life.
1. See Thomas F. McLarty, III & Richard Klein, A Latin American Opportunity in
World Energy Woes, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 76-78 (2005) (discussing the oil
and natural gas reserves in South America); see also PETER MEISEN & SEBASTIAN KRUMPEL,
GLOBAL ENERGY NETWORK INST., RENEWABLE ENERGY POTENTIAL OF LATIN AMERICA 22-76
(2009) (surveying the renewable energy resources of many of the South American
countries).
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their borders.2 Although many South American countries have seen steady
economic growth in the past fifty years, others have lagged. 3 However, the
rapidly developing nations and the poorer nations have one feature in com-
mon: an inability to secure steady and efficient energy supplies.4 Several
factors contribute to this phenomenon. First, the energy infrastructure of
South America is inadequately developed to maximize the potential of the
continent's energy resources.5  Second, international tensions among
neighboring countries have led to strained political and economic relation-
ships.6 Third, domestic political policies often trump the desire for
regional integration. 7 Finally, in the absence of an international legal
framework for protecting energy investments, foreign investors are some-
what reluctant to contribute to the South American regional energy
infrastructure."
Many South American countries are alike insofar as they have under-
developed energy infrastructures. These countries can additionally reap
the benefits of common infrastructure development. Several South Ameri-
can nations have tended to adhere to nationally oriented development poli-
2. See Stephanie Hanson, Energy Bottlenecks in South America, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/16037/energybottlenecks
insouth america.html (noting that the political policies of some South American coun-
tries have stymied international energy investment and slowed the development of
energy infrastructure).
3. See ANDRES SOLIMANO & RAIMUNDO SOTO, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA IN
THE LATE 20TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION 10 (2004) ("[T]here is substantial
heterogeneity in growth experiences across Latin American economies.").
4. See, e.g., Dean Anderson, Is South America Set for Huge Energy Crisis?, POWER &
ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.nextgenpe.com/news/south-america-energy-
crisis (noting concerns that South America may enter an energy crisis due to a lack of
energy security); see also Jose Miguel Insulza, Energy and Development in South America,
in ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 9, 9
(Cynthia J. Arnson et al. eds., 2008) ("[Tihere is concern throughout the Americas about
the inability to supply reliable and affordable energy to meet national and regional
needs.").
5. See Hanson, supra note 2 ("In South America, the opportunity to develop a lucra-
tive natural gas market is hindered by the lack of sufficient infrastructure."); see also Luis
Alberto Moreno, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Speech at the Can-
ning House Conference: Enhancing Competitiveness in Latin America: The Role of Infra-
structure (Jan. 21, 2008) ("As it stands, Latin America is clearly far behind other regions
in providing access to public utilities.").
6. See The Difficult Path toward Energy Integration in South America, UNIVERSIA
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (July 26, 2006), http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?
fa=viewfeature&id=1204&language=english [hereinafter UNIVERSIA] ("[M]any experts
have doubts about the viability of the anticipated integration of this sector in South
America, given the diplomatic and trade conflicts that currently afflict the region.").
7. See David Mares, Energy, Development, and Regional Integration, in ENERGY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 61, 69 (Cynthia J. Arnson
et al. eds., 2008) (discussing some nations' propensity to value resource nationalism
over regional cooperation).
8. See ADILSON DE OLIVEIRA, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENERGY SECURITY IN
SOUTH AMERICA, THE ROLE OF BRAZIL 14 (2010) (noting the lack of a legal system that
facilitates private investment in energy), available at http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/
energy-security-southamerica.pdf.
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cies;9 however, recently they appear to be more open to regional
cooperation. First, "[iun the energy sector, the Latin American Energy
Organization (OLADE) was created with the objective of promoting
regional trade in energy."'10 OLADE was formed in 1973 and is comprised
of a number of Latin American countries, including ten South American
nations.' One of OLADE's primary strategic objectives is "[t]o promote
the development of regional and sub-regional energy integration
activities.' ' 2
Additionally, in 2000, the South American presidents met in Brasilia,
Brazil "to promote the process of political, social and economic integration
of South America .... ,,13 At this meeting, the South American presidents
agreed to create the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure
in South America (IIRSA).14 IIRSA "aims at developing the regional integra-
tion of transport, communication and energy infrastructure . . . . 15
Through the IIRSA framework, member governments have established 524
infrastructure projects with an estimated investment of US $96.12 bil-
lion.1 6 Through the establishment of OLADE and IIRSA, it appears as
though the South American nations are making greater efforts to address
energy infrastructure development at a regional level.'
7
Furthermore, in 2008, leaders from the members of the Andean Com-
munity (CAN), 18 Mercosur, 19 and non-Andean Community member South
American countries20 formed the South American Union of Nations
(UNASUR). 2 1 In the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, the member states cite
that a specific objective is the attainment of "[elnergy integration for the
9. For instance, Chile has stated that it has a priority of becoming autonomous in
the energy sector. UNIVERSIA, supra note 6. Additionally, Bolivia decided to nationalize
its hydrocarbon industry in 2006. Hanson, supra note 2.
10. DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 2.
11. These members are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. OLADE: Who are we?, OLADE, http://www.olade.
org.ec/en/who-are-we (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
12. OLADE: Integration Department, OLADE, http://www.olade.org/en/integration-
department (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
13. IIRSA: Origins, IIRSA, http://www.iirsa.org/BancoConocimiento/O/origenes/
origenes-ENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG&CodSeccion=117 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
14. Id.
15. DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 1.
16. IIRSA Projects Portfolio, IIRSA, http://www.iirsa.org//Cartera-ENG.asp?Codldi-
oma=ENG (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
17. But see DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 1 (arguing that IIRSA has largely neglected
projects related to energy infrastructure).
18. The Andean Community is a trade bloc currently comprised of Peru, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Colombia. Who Are We?, COMUNIDAD ANDINA, http://www.comunida-
dandina.org/ingles/quienes/brief.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
19. Mercosur is a trade bloc comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay.
Mercosur (Common Market of the South) - Profile, BBC NEws, June 16, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm.
20. Most notably, with Chile and Venezuela (both former members of the Andean
Community).
21. South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty, May 23, 2008, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/csn/treaty.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2010)
[hereinafter UNASUR Treaty].
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integral and sustainable use of the resources of the region .... ,22 Whether
UNASUR will be effective in implementing this vision remains to be seen.
However, energy integration may achieve many benefits.
First, through energy integration, South American countries can
achieve energy security. 23 Energy security refers to two primary concepts:
Reliability of energy flow and security of energy supply.24 Reliability of
energy flow is achieved when an energy system is able to withstand abrupt
cuts in energy supply to end-users. 25 In order to achieve reliability of
energy flow, an energy distribution system must be nimble enough to pro-
vide alternate routes to consumers in the event that a storm, system failure,
or catastrophe affects a particular segment of the infrastructure. 26 Security
of energy supply "refers to protection from events that require energy sup-
ply cuts for long periods of time. '27 Energy security can be furthered by
regional integration, since a regional infrastructure facilitates a broader
network of distribution channels and helps stabilize energy prices in the
event that any particular country's energy supply is cut for a long period of
time.28
Additionally, energy integration facilitates economic efficiency. 29 For
one, increased access to energy is a precursor for economic growth.30
Additionally, "[c]ross-border cooperation in all areas, including in energy
of various forms, brings about important savings and cost reductions. ''31
By regionally integrating projects and facilities, South American countries
could lower transaction costs. 32 Furthermore, South American countries
could satisfy their combined energy needs by establishing a framework of
regional reserves. 33 A regionally integrated reserve system would help
establish longer-term energy prices that are less susceptible to short-term
domestic price fluctuations. 34
22. Id.
23. See DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 2-7 (discussing how a regional market would
facilitate a system whereby countries could guarantee adequate energy levels for their
demands); see also WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, REGIONAL ENERGY INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 12(2005) ("Security of supply is one of the primary drivers in developing power intercon-
nections between countries and regions.").
24. See DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 3 (discussing how the lack of regional integration leads to situations
where "low-cost energy resources remain underutilized" and price regulation becomes
difficult).
29. See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 12.
30. See id. at 25.
31. Francisco Rojas Aravena, Energy Integration in Latin America: Limits and Pos-
sibilities, in ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SouTH AMERICA: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 13,
14 (Cynthia J. Arnson et al. eds., 2008).
32. WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 26.
33. See DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 12-13 (discussing the benefits of a multilateral
energy security reserve).
34. See id. at 13 ("[T]he energy prices in the energy security flows between countries
of the region would not be linked to the prices currently set in the domestic markets.").
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Although South American countries would benefit from regional inte-
gration of their energy infrastructure, several obstacles to energy integra-
tion exist. First, certain political stances stymie the integration process.
For example, some countries seem intent on maintaining autonomous
national energy sectors. 35 Other countries have historically poor interna-
tional relations with one another, creating political tension around many of
their dealings. 36 Second, economic considerations also stifle the process
of integration. For instance, some of the energy exporting countries appear
more interested in maximizing the short-term benefits they can achieve by
charging high prices to neighboring countries than realizing the long-term
benefits of regional integration.3 7 Finally, the lack of an effective legal
framework for international investment casts a shadow of uncertainty over
integration efforts. 3 8
In the early 1990s, Europe sought to address similar obstacles in its
own effort to achieve regional energy integration.3 9 The end of the Cold
War created an opportunity for increased regional cooperation and interde-
pendence.40 Russia and many of the former Soviet Union states had sub-
stantial energy resources, while the Western European countries sought to
diversify their energy supply in an effort to decrease their dependence on
Middle Eastern oil resources. 4 1 In an effort to help former Soviet Union
countries assimilate into the broader European community, Dutch Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed the creation of a regional integration
mechanism.4 2 The regional energy integration process began with the
signing of the 1991 European Energy Charter, "a declaration of political
intent to promote East-West energy cooperation .... ,,43 In 1994, the over-
whelming majority44 of signatories to the European Energy Charter
decided to enter into a legally binding multilateral agreement known as the
35. See UNIVERSIA, supra note 6 (discussing Chile's intention to create an autono-
mous national energy supply).
36. See id. ("Bolivia refuses to sell directly to Chile because Chile has not agreed to
Bolivia's historical demands for 'access to the sea,' the Pacific Ocean.").
37. See id. (noting the arrangement between Bolivia and Argentina, whereby Argen-
tina buys natural gas from Bolivia for higher prices, then sells the natural gas at a pre-
mium to Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).
38. See DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 14 (noting the deficit of a legal framework to
facilitate private investment); see also Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration
of International Oil, Gas, and Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
591, 592 (2007) ("Policies discouraging the use of international arbitration and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards are re-surfacing to impede foreign investment in energy sectors
throughout Latin America.").
39. See Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas Walde, Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in
International Energy, 24J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCEs L. 523, 524-25 (2006) (discussing
the creation of the Energy Charter Treaty as a means to regionally cooperate to develop
energy infrastructure).
40. Id. at 524.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 525-26.
44. All of the signatories to the European Energy Charter are members of the Energy
Charter Conference except Serbia and Montenegro, which is an observer to the Energy
Charter Conference. See id. at 525.
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Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 4 5
One of the cardinal objectives of the ECT "is to 'strengthen the rule of
law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be
observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associ-
ated with energy-related investment and trade." 4 6 The content of the ECT
is based on three sources: "(1) The well-established practice of [bilateral
investment treaties] . . . (2) The liberalisation [sic] impetus from several
'Directives' reforming EU energy law-Directives on 'licensing upstream
energy resources,' on utility procurement, on transit, on non-discrimina-
tory access to energy transport infrastructure . . . [and] (3) GATT .... ,,47
The ECT's protection of foreign investments is premised on the principle of
non-discrimination. 48 ECT member countries have a binding obligation to
treat investors from other member states according to "national treatment,
or most-favoured nation treatment (whichever is more favorable) ....- 49
This aspect of the ECT effectively carries the legal weight of an ad hoc
bilateral investment treaty created between the foreign investor and the
state receiving the investment. 5 0
Additionally, a mechanism for "[i]nvestment arbitration ... is a key
feature of the ECT .... -51 Under the ECT, foreign investors can sue a host
state before an international arbitral tribunal. 52 In a dispute, the standards
used to judge a sovereign's conduct "are exogenous to that sovereign's own
legal system."53 Although some countries have been reluctant to submit to
an external authority in dispute resolution,5 4 this feature of the ECT's dis-
pute mechanism lends credibility to the agreements made by member
countries. 5 5 Indeed, "without such external authority, the duties assumed
mean little in practice."5 6
Although no South American country chose to participate in the
ECT,57 the ECT can provide a model framework for enhancing the region's
international investment framework. More specifically, South America, as
45. Id. at 525-26.
46. Matthew T. Parish & Charles B. Rosenberg, An Introduction to the Energy Charter
Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 191, 191 (2009) (quoting Energy Charter: About the Char-
ter, ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7 (last visited Mar. 30,
2011) [hereinafter "About the ECT"]). See also DE OLIVEIRA, supra note 8, at 3 ("The
Energy Charter contains foreign investment protection clauses and mechanisms for con-
flict resolution.").
47. Konoplyanik & WAlde, supra note 39, at 528.
48. Id. at 532.
49. Id. at 533.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 546.
52. Id.
53. Parish & Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 192.
54. See Konoplyanik & WAlde, supra note 39, at 546 (nothing that countries "with a
traditional emphasis on national sovereignty" have great problems accepting the author-
ity and jurisdiction of an international tribunal).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. DE OLIvEIa, supra note 8, at 4. It should be noted, however, that Venezuela is
currently an observer to the Energy Charter. Id. at 4 n.8.
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a region, may be able to further attract foreign investment by adopting a
regional energy investment treaty similar to the ECT. This Note will assess
the feasibility of a South American Energy Treaty, considering the political,
economic, and legal obstacles that exist in the region. Part I of this Note
will discuss some of the recent trends in the region that trouble foreign
investors, focusing on a renewed spirit of resource nationalism exhibited
by some of the resource-rich countries. Part II will provide a brief, general
overview of international investment law. Part III will summarize the ECT,
providing an overview of its key aspects and noting its ability to facilitate
energy integration by promoting foreign investment. Part IV will assess the
feasibility of a South American Energy Treaty. The benefits of such a legal
framework, and the obstacles it faces, will be discussed in detail. Finally, I
provide concluding remarks.
1. The Growing Specter of Resource Nationalism: A Threat to Foreign
Investment
Two somewhat divergent trends generally color South American atti-
tudes toward the energy sector. On the one hand, there is a growing sense
of resource nationalism in the region.58 In the face of rising energy prices,
countries driven by resource nationalism seek to assert the state's sover-
eign authority over the activities of international energy companies operat-
ing in their territory.59 On the other hand, some South American
countries exhibit a willingness to allow a greater degree of international
investment in the energy sector. 60 These countries have embraced various
levels of foreign investment by privatizing or partly privatizing state-owned
energy companies, promoting "the creation of independent power produc-
ers[,j or encourag[ing] the construction of new power plants by the private
sector."
6 1
However, the renewed spirit of resource nationalism, reflected in some
recent actions taken by resource-rich countries, may be of concern to for-
eign investors. 6 2 Resource nationalism signals, among other things, a
nation's willingness to take certain actions toward their natural resources
that may be detrimental to foreign investors. 63 Energy investments are gen-
58. Christine St. Germain, Note, What Does the Bank of the South Really Signify?, 14
LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 835, 843 (2008); see also Toni Johnson, The Return of Resource
Nationalism, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/publi-
cation/13989/return of resourcenationalism.html (discussing recent actions taken by
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia to nationalize certain activities in the energy sector).
59. See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering
and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas Industry, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 79,
79-80 (2009-2010).
60. Brunet & Lentini, supra note 38, at 593.
61. Id. at 597-98.
62. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 79-80.
63. See Nouriel Roubini, Is Resource Nationalism Back?, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/09/opec-brazil-oil-china-rare-metals-alberta-opinions-
columnists-nouriel-roubini.html ("While these policy changes may be politically popu-
lar-and according to some analysts, may even help fund infrastructure development-
they also run the risk of further deferring investment in the oil and gas sector.").
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erally long-term capital-intensive projects. 6 4 The geographically fixed, cap-
ital-intensive nature of energy investments makes them particularly
susceptible to certain political and economic risks, most notably nationali-
zation or expropriation. 65 Countries exhibiting signs of resource national-
ism may appear riskier to foreign investors because these countries
demonstrate an increased willingness to expropriate or nationalize energy
projects in the interest of maintaining greater control over their natural
resources.
66
Over the past decade, a few of the more resource-rich South American
countries have taken actions that may worry foreign investors. Specifi-
cally, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have all taken actions that demon-
strate a spirit of resource nationalism, such as the seizure of assets of
foreign oil companies and revisions to contracts.6 7 At the very least, some
of these actions indicate a greater willingness to eschew liberal foreign
investment policies in favor of asserting sovereignty over the state's natural
resources. 68 Because these countries lay claim to substantial natural
energy resources, 69 they are particularly powerful players in the region's
energy sector. Since these countries potentially pose a serious obstacle to
the region's ability to obtain foreign investment, their actions indicate a
problem that a regional energy treaty might overcome.
A. Venezuela
Venezuela plays a key role in future efforts to achieve South American
energy integration, since it has the largest proven oil and natural gas
reserves on the continent. 70 As of January 1, 2010, the country boasted
99.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 176 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas reserves.7 1 As a result of its vast energy resources, Venezuela
has had an important voice in the international community: in 1960, the
Venezuelan Minister of Petroleum, Perez Alfonso, proposed the founding of
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 7 2 Since
64. See MIRIAN KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: COMPLIANCE
WITH, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 7
(1998).
65. Id.
66. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 82.
67. See Sid Verma, Resource Nationalism: Alive and Well, EMERGING MARKETS (Feb. 23,
2010), http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2449493/RESOURCE-NATIONALISM-
Alive-and-well.html.
68. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 82 (noting the various stages of resource
nationalism).
69. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: VENEZUELA 9 (2010), http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Venezuela/pdf.pdf [hereinafter VENEZUELA BRIEF]; Bolivia
Confirms Pipeline to Supply Paraguay and Uruguay with Natural Gas, MercoPress, July
17, 2010, http://en.mercopress.com/2010/07/17/bolivia-confirms-pipeline-to-supply-
paraguay-and-uruguay-with-natural-gas; Brunet & Lentini, supra note 38 at 629.
70. Larry B. Pascal, Developments in the Venezuelan Hydrocarbon Sector, 15 LAW &
Bus. REV. AM. 531, 531 (2009).
71. VENEZUELA BRIEF, supra note 69, at 9.
72. Pascal, supra note 70, at 532-33. See also Luis E. Cuervo, The Uncertain Fate of
Venezuela's Black Pearl: The Petrostate and its Ambiguous Oil and Gas Legislation, 32
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the election of President Hugo ChAvez in 1999, Venezuela has reasserted
its commitment to OPEC, 73 criticized former President George W. Bush
and his policies,74 and proposed the creation of a South American regional
development bank.75 Additionally, Venezuela's rich oil and gas resources
have made it attractive to international energy companies seeking to
engage in exploration and production activities. 76
Venezuela's willingness to allow foreign energy companies to operate
within its territory has been somewhat erratic. In 1975, Venezuela
adopted the Ley OrgAnica que Reserva al Estado la Industria y el Comercio
de los Hidrocarburos ("Nationalization Law") in an initial effort to nation-
alize its natural resources.7 7 This law granted Venezuela a monopoly over
oil and gas operations within its territory, terminated all outstanding con-
cessions, and allowed expropriation of concessionaries' assets only on cer-
tain terms.78 While this law effectively signaled Venezuela's move to
obtain control over its natural resources, "the government could still enter
into association contracts with private parties."'79
In the 1990s, Venezuela became increasingly open to foreign invest-
ment in the energy sector.80 Under the program known as Apertura
Petrolera (the "Petroleum Opening"), Venezuela promoted international
investment in oil projects.8 1 The primary goal of the Petroleum Opening
was to rejuvenate existing oil fields, develop Venezuela's extra-heavy crude
oil, and further explore new fields.8 2
The Petroleum Opening entailed three rounds of bidding.8 3 The first
round sought to auction off some of the more labor-intensive oil fields;
however, only five of the nine fields offered received bids.8 4 The second
round offered more attractive oil fields, which resulted in an increased for-
eign interest.8 5 Forty-four companies or syndicates bid on eleven of the
thirteen fields offered. 86 Finally, Venezuela put twenty oil fields on the
auction block in the third round.8 7 This round attracted 259 bidders,
partly because of the favorable contract terms allowing operators to receive
Hous.J. INT'L L. 637, 641 n.13 (2010) (describing Pedro Alfonso as a founding father of
OPEC).
73. Pascal, supra note 70, at 533.
74. Cuervo, supra note 72, at 654 n.99.
75. St. Germain, supra note 58, at 835.
76. See Cuervo, supra note 72, at 649-51.
77. Id. at 642-43.
78. Id. at 644-45.
79. Id. at 645.
80. Pascal, supra note 70, at 533.
81. Id.
82. Larry Spancake, Venezuela Offers Full Market Value to Encourage Foreign Invest-
ment in Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 1999), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
finance/usi&to/upstream/venezuela.html.
83. Jay G. Martin, Venezuela as an Opportunity for Investment in the Petroleum Indus-
try, 20 ENERGY L.J. 325, 329 (1999).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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"the full market value of additional output, less one-sixth royalty and
administrative costs, until they recover their investment."8 8 Ultimately, the
Petroleum Opening resulted in "thirty-two operating service agree-
ments ... and four risk profit sharing agreements with twenty-two separate
foreign oil companies, including international oil majors like Chevron, BP,
Total, and Repsol-YPF." 89
Although the Petroleum Opening increased foreign investment, the
program also received criticism within Venezuela.90 The most notable
critic, Hugo ChAvez, was elected president of Venezuela in December
1998.91 In February of the following year, the Venezuelan National Assem-
bly promulgated a new law granting the President fairly sweeping powers
to issue decrees governing many sectors of the economy. 92 Under this law,
President ChAvez enacted a series of decrees and policies aimed toward
recovering greater state control over the country's natural resources. 93
In 2001, President Chdvez enacted a new Organic Hydrocarbons Law
("Hydrocarbons Law"). 94 Some of the notable features of this law include
a broad purview over oil and gas activities, a recognition that Venezuela
owns all hydrocarbon resources within its territory, and an increased
power for the executive to change contractual agreements and revoke rights
to engage in energy activities. 95 Additionally, the Hydrocarbons Law indi-
cated that international conventions and treaties apply to Venezuela's oil
and gas business, reaffirming Venezuela's obligations under its bilateral
and multilateral investment treaties, as well as its ongoing relationship with
OPEC and foreign nations.96 Finally, the Hydrocarbons Law substantially
increased royalties from 16.66% 9 7 to a flat 30%,98 and it contained a provi-
sion that established a. rental fee of 100 tax units per square kilometer,
which increases 5% per year. 99
One important question is the significance of Article IV of the Hydro-
carbons Law, which confirms the "public policy" principle.' 00 The "public
policy" principle is a well-established feature of oil and gas law, which
affirms a state's sovereign power to expropriate or nationalize hydrocar-
bon-related activities in the public interest. 10 1 According to this provision,
88. Id.
89. Pascal, supra note 70, at 533.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.; Thomas J. Pate, Note, Evaluating Stabilization Clauses in Venezuela's Stra-
tegic Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The Return of
a Forgotten Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum Industry, 40 U. MItA1
INTER-AM. L. REv. 347, 376 (2009).
94. Pate, supra note 93, at 376.
95. See Cuervo, supra note 72, at 659-63 (detailing the powers given to the executive
by the new law).
96. Id. at 663-64.
97. See Martin, supra note 83, at 330.
98. Cuervo, supra note 72, at 665.
99. Id. at 666.
100. Id. at 660.
101. Id.
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it appears as though the state may expropriate resources and revoke per-
mits when necessary. 10 2 But it is unclear how this provision may affect
choice-of-law provisions in contracts between Venezuela and international
companies. 10 3 On the one hand, "[miandatory applicable law and jurisdic-
tion clauses are deemed incorporated in . . . all oil-and-gas-related con-
tracts." 10 4 On the other hand, however, it is unclear whether clauses
providing for international arbitration would be salient in the face of the
Hydrocarbons Law. 10 5
The Hydrocarbons Law signified an initial swing of the pendulum
back toward policies grounded in a sense of resource nationalism, and
more recent policies reaffirmed this trend. First, on October 10, 2004, the
Venezuelan government announced the Plena Soberania Petrolera policy
("Full Petroleum Sovereignty" plan), 10 6 which aimed at achieving complete
national sovereignty over Venezuela's energy reserves. 10 7 Second, in 2005,
the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP) announced that
four joint venture agreements with foreign investors were illegal under the
Nationalization Law.' 0 8 The MEP unilaterally modified the strategic agree-
ments, indicating that the foreign investors "would have to 'migrate' their
projects into mixed companies in which the state would have at least a 511%
interest."' 1 9 Furthermore, in 2006, "despite assurances in 2002 that the
Hydrocarbons Law would only apply to new projects, [President] Chavez
announced that the tax rates stipulated in the Hydrocarbons Law would
apply retroactively to [the four strategic association agreements with for-
eign investors], thus raising the applicable income tax rate from 34% to
50%."110
Finally, in February 2007, President ChAvez issued a presidential
decree, which ordered the adjustment of all contracts relating to associa-
tions operating in the Orinoco Belt and all production sharing agree-
ments.11 ' This decree replaced all such contracts with joint ventures in
which Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela's national oil com-
pany,1 12 or "its subsidiaries would have at least a 60% ownership."' 13
Companies that were party to these agreements had four months to con-
sider and agree on the terms of the new joint ventures. 1 14 Furthermore,
the decree stipulated that any disputes arising out of the decree "would be
governed by Venezuelan law and be subject to the jurisdiction of Venezue-
102. See id. at 660-61 (suggesting the consequences of the "public policy" principle).
103. Id. at 660 ("[T]he validity of choice-of-law provisions choosing anything other
than Venezuelan law-as well as all arbitration clauses-would be in question.").
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 666.
107. Pascal, supra note 70, at 548.
108. See Pate, supra note 93, at 377.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Cuervo, supra note 72, at 676.
112. See Pascal, supra note 70, at 531.
113. Cuervo, supra note 72, at 676.
114. Id. at 676-77.
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lan courts."'1 15 New joint venture agreements were reached with four inter-
national energy companies; however, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips
instead decided to leave the Orinoco Belt and commence arbitration pro-
ceedings. 1 16 As of the time of publication of this Note, these arbitration
proceedings are currently pending before the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 117
B. Bolivia
Although considerably smaller than Venezuela in terms of its overall
natural resources, Bolivia still lays claim to substantial oil and natural gas
reserves.11 8 Bolivia has roughly 1.4 billion barrels of oil reserves, and it
has an estimated 54 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves." 9 Bolivia is
a key energy supplier in the region, supplying approximately 30 million
cubic meters of natural gas to Brazil daily.120 Additionally, Bolivia is cur-
rently holding discussions with Uruguay and Paraguay about creating a
pipeline that would supply natural gas to the two countries. 12 1
Like Venezuela, Bolivia has recently taken steps toward resource
nationalism. First, in May 2005, Bolivia enacted Hydrocarbon Law
3058.122 Hydrocarbon Law 3058 contains several provisions that under-
standably concern foreign investors. For instance, Article 5 of the law
grants ownership of all hydrocarbons produced at the wellhead to
Bolivia. 1 23 Furthermore, Hydrocarbon Law 3058 requires contractors to
alter their risk-sharing contracts granted under the former hydrocarbons
law-Law 1689-within six months. 12 4 Additionally, the new royalties and
taxes on hydrocarbon production paid to the state under these new con-
tracts must not equal less than "fifty percent of the value of the hydrocar-
115. See id. at 677.
116. Id.
117. See List of Pending Cases, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (Mar. 6, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ (click "Cases" on the left menu;
then click "List of Cases" on the drop-down menu; then follow "Pending Cases" hyper-
link) (showing Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/27 and ConocoPhillips Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30).
118. See Bolivia Confirms Pipeline to Supply Paraguay and Uruguay with Natural Gas,
MERCOPREsS, July 17, 2010, http://en.mercopress.com/2010/07/17/bolivia-confirms-
pipeline-to-supply-paraguay-and-uruguay-with-natural-gas ("Bolivia has the second larg-
est proven reserves of gas in South America behind Venezuela.").
119. Petrobras Plans to Explore Three New Fields in Bolivia, ENERGY-PEDIA NEWS, Jan. 19,
2011, available at http://www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=143796.
120. Id.
121. See MERCOPRESS, supra note 118 (noting that Argentina is also included in the
discussions because the proposed pipeline would have to cross part of Argentina).
122. Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 84. Note that Hydrocarbon Law 3058 was
implemented before President Morales took office. Hydrocarbon Law 3058 was a refer-
endum voted on by the people of Bolivia before Evo Morales was inaugurated. See Maria
V. Vargas, Latin America: 2005 Developments in Hydrocarbons Law, 1 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 185, 185 (2006).
123. Vargas, supra note 122, at 185.
124. Id. at 185-86.
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bon production.' 12 5
Second, Evo Morales, the current president of Bolivia, 126 appears to be
another South American leader poised to act on a growing sense of
resource nationalism. He has appeared on billboards along with the slogan
"[w]ithout nationalization there is no development," 127 and his populist
rhetoric turned into action quite early in his presidency. Under President
Morales' leadership, Bolivia took several ambitious actions toward Bolivia's
energy sector that may repel foreign investors.1 2
8
In May 2006, less than six months after President Morales took office,
the Bolivian government "issued a decree nationalizing the hydrocarbons
sector and calling for the renegotiation of contracts with hydrocarbons
companies."'1 29 This decree mandated private energy producers operating
in certain Bolivian areas to give an additional 32% of their production to
YPFB, the Bolivian state-owned energy company. 130 This effectively gave
YPFB 82% of production in these areas, as opposed to the 50% production
they enjoyed before the decree.13'
Additionally, the Bolivian government carried out the 2006 nationali-
zation decree in an aggressive political manner. After issuing the decree,
President Morales ordered Bolivian troops to occupy the country's natural
gas fields. 132 Some of Bolivia's foreign investors, who had invested roughly
$4 billion in the energy sector since it became privatized in the 1990s,
reacted negatively to the country's aggressive posturing. 133 For example,
Spanish-Argentine joint venture Repsol YPF indicated that "it will act to
protect its investments and take legal action if necessary."'134 Brazil's state-
owned energy company, Petrobras, responded similarly and halted further
investments.135
Although some assert that President Morales' "bark is worse than his
bite,"'136 gas exports to Brazil fell by a third in 2009.137 Whether the
125. Id. at 187.
126. See Frank M. Walsh, The Legal Death of the Latin American Democracy: Bolivarian
Populism's Model for Centralizing Power, Eliminating Political Opposition, and Undermin-
ing the Rule of Law, 16 LAw & Bus. REV. AM. 241, 252 (2010).
127. Naomi Mapstone, Bolivia's President Keeps Faith with Populism, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/f48clI 18-e0fd-1lde-af7a-00144feab49a.
html#axzzlBzElE8D6.
128. See infra Part I.B.
129. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: BOLIVIA (2010), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm.
130. Diego Rojas, The Bolivian Nationalization of Hydrocarbons Process, INT'L LEGAL
NEWS, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.imakenews.com/iln/e-articleOO0722418.cfm?x-b11,
0,W.
131. Id.
132. Carin Zissis, Bolivia's Nationalization of Oil and Gas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, (May 12, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10682/bolivias-nationalization_
of-oil and-gas.html.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Sid Verma, Resource Nationalism: Alive and Well, EMERGING MARKETS, Mar. 23,
2010, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2449493/RESOURCE-NATIONALISM-
Alive-and-well.html (quoting former Bolivian president Carlos Mesa Gisbert as stating
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Morales administration will flexibly deal with foreign investors in the
future remains to be seen. However, the actions that President Morales
took toward nationalizing Bolivia's energy sector at the beginning of his
administration strongly signify that Bolivia may be driven by an attitude of
resource nationalism. Accordingly, foreign investors may be increasingly
wary of investing in the Bolivian energy markets.
C. Ecuador
Ecuador is another resource-rich country that offers numerous invest-
ment opportunities for foreign energy companies, 138 yet is facing a large
number of energy-related arbitration claims. 139 Ecuador is notoriously oil-
rich, having proven reserves of 4.63 billion barrels. 140 Indeed, Ecuador
has the third largest oil reserves on the continent, behind Venezuela and
Brazil. 14 1 However, despite its large oil reserves, Ecuador has not been able
to effectively tap its energy potential. 142
Ecuador has had difficult relations with foreign energy investors for
some time. First, at the beginning of the millennium, Ecuador's internal
revenue agency refused to allow the return of roughly $200 million in
value-added tax drawbacks withheld from foreign oil companies. 143 Ecua-
dor's value-added tax laws arguably created greater uncertainty for inves-
tors, since the Ecuadorian internal revenue service's interpretation differed
from the expectations of investors. 14 4 Although this action did not neces-
sarily indicate a growing sense of resource nationalism within Ecuador, it
arguably increased investment risks.
Furthermore, the Ecuadorian climate for foreign investment has been
increasingly unattractive since President Rafael Correa took office. 14 5
Since President Correa was elected, Ecuador has taken an increasing
that "'[Evo Morales] is very radical in his words, but more flexible when it comes to
business with the investing companies."').
137. See id.
138. Brunet & Lentini, supra note 38, at 598 ("In 2005, Petroecuador's production
represented only 38% of national crude oil output, with the remainder coming from
private projects between the Ecuadorian government and foreign oil producers.").
139. See id. at 610 ("Most of the energy related disputes are filed against Argentina,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.").
140. See id. at 629.
141. Id.
142. McClarty & Klein, supra note 1, at 78 (noting that as of 2005 only three percent
of Ecuador's oil reserves were tapped).
143. Hamed Amiri Ghaemmaghami, Note, Can't Live With'ena, Can't Live Without'em:
Ecuadorian Value-Added Tax Laws, Foreign Oil Investors, and the Andean Trade Preferences
Act, 10 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 391, 392-93 (2004).
144. See id. at 403 ("Assuming that these companies have forecast their earnings and
made business decisions on the fact that the VAT drawbacks would be refunded, the
failure to do so would cause severe disparities between the oil companies' expectations
and their actual results.").
145. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 85; see also David Mares, Resource Nation-
alism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications for Global Oil Supplies 24
(Jan. 2010) (unpublished working paper, on file with the James A. Baker III Institute for
Public Policy) (noting that the Correa administration is more likely to push energy pol-
icy toward resource nationalism than certain other South American leaders).
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amount of net income from oil projects. 14 6 After passing a reformed
energy law (Law 42) in April 2006, the government took as much as sev-
enty percent of the average amount of income. 14 7 After contract negotia-
tions mandated by the Correa administration were finalized in late 2007,
the government now receives closer to eighty percent of net oil income. 1 48
Along with these quite dramatic increases in the Ecuadorian govern-
ment's share of oil income, the government has also physically taken facili-
ties from foreign investors. 14 9 For instance, Occidental was Ecuador's
largest investor, responsible for roughly twenty percent of Ecuador's total
oil production. 150 Ecuador argued that Occidental breached its contract
with the country by inappropriately conveying a portion of its interest in
Ecuadorian oil fields to another company. 15 1 As a result of that alleged
breach, the state took Occidental's assets.152 However, Occidental argues
that Ecuador took its facilities "in retaliation for the company's victory
against [the state] in a $75-million tax-arbitration case." 153 The company
responded to the seizure by filing an arbitration claim against Ecuador at
the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).1 54
That arbitration hearing is currently pending. 15 5
II. International Investment Law: A Brief Overview
The actions of nations guided by a spirit of resource nationalism sig-
nal increased risk to foreign investors. These risks essentially derive from a
state's willingness to unilaterally change the bargain of a contract between
the state and a foreign investor, or to expropriate or nationalize the foreign
investor's assets to some extent.' 5 6 Generally speaking, international
investment law arose as a means of ensuring foreign investors a certain
146. LatinBusinessChronicle.com, Ecuador Oil: Reduced Investments, http://www.
latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=4468 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Parmy Olson, Ecuador Takes Field from Irani's Occidental Petroleum, FORBES,
May 17, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/17/occidental-petroleum-ecuador-
cxpo_0517autofacescan01.html.
150. Reuters, Ecuador Cancels an Oil Deal with Occidental Petroleum, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/17/business/worldbusiness/
17oil.html.
151. Hal Weitzman, Ecuador 'Was Right to Revoke Occidental License', FIN. TIMES, May
21, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/89d2a3d8-e8f3-1 ida-b 110-0000779e
2340.html#axzzlBp71ZwLH.
152. Id.
153. Elizabeth Douglass, Occidental's Profit Cut by Ecuador Loss, L.A. TIMES, July 6,
2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/06/business/fi-oxy6.
154. Id.
155. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/
06/11, Hydrocarbon Concession (Jul. 13, 2006).
156. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 59, at 82 ("Other specific manifestations of
resource nationalism may be found in the resource-producing country's move to maxi-
mize revenue from oil and gas production by unilaterally changing the terms of the
original contract (the phenomenon described by Harvard economist Raymond Vernon
as 'obsolescing bargain'), by forced renegotiation of the original contract, or by other
forms of economic coercion such as forced sale.").
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level of protection over their investments made in host countries. 15 7 Origi-
nally, under foreign investment law, it was understood that states lacked
the ability to "expropriate or nationalise [sic] foreign assets."' 8 This
understanding stemmed from the idea that foreign investors were subject to
the laws of their home country, and that country alone should have the
power to determine the investors' property rights.15 9
However, this understanding evolved into a doctrine under which
states may invoke their sovereignty to expropriate foreign assets, subject to
certain criteria of international law.' 60 It is now an established principle
of international investment law that a state may protect its own subjects if
they are injured by a state act contrary to treaty law or customary interna-
tional law. 16 1 States often enter into treaties with other states to define
more precisely and to guarantee agreed-upon standards of protection to
give to foreign investors, as well as the mechanism to resolve disputes aris-
ing out of the investments. 162 This section will very briefly discuss some
of these standards of international law, as well as its dispute resolution
mechanisms, in order to better facilitate a treatment of the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT).
A. Standards of Protection in International Investment Law
1. Most-Favored Nation Treatment
Most-favored-nation treatment (MFN treatment) is a cardinal principle
of international investment law. 1 6 3 MFN treatment dates back to the fif-
teenth century, finding its way into a treaty between the King of England
and the Duke of Burgundy. 164 Essentially, MFN treatment "is a treaty pro-
vision whereby a State undertakes an obligation towards another State to
accord most-favoured-nation [sic] treatment in an agreed sphere of rela-
tions."'165 The goal underlying MFN treatment is for state parties to treat
each other, as well as their respective citizens, at least as well as each state
party treats third party states and their citizens. 166 For example, in a hypo-
thetical investment treaty between Venezuela and Canada, MFN treatment
guarantees that Venezuela will not treat investments from Canada any less
favorably than it would treat investments from Brazil or Chile. The idea is
to create a non-discrimination clause in the investment treaty, ensuring
that the party state is not denied any investment benefits. 16 7 As a result,
157. See SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 8 (2008).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 7-8.
160. See id. at 8-9.
161. See id. at 12-13.
162. See OMALLU, supra note 64, at 8-9.
163. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 68.
164. Id.
165. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
166. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW 186 (2008).
167. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 68.
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"as soon as [a] state ... confer[s] a relevant benefit [to a third party state],
[that benefit] is automatically extended to the state that benefits from the
MFN clause," 168 putting the party state and its citizen investors on an
equal ground with investors from other states.
2. National Treatment
Whereas MFN treatment assures that no state or its citizens will be
discriminated against in relation to other states and their citizens, the prin-
ciple of national treatment guarantees party states and their citizens the
same treatment as nationals. 169 In accordance with the principle of
national treatment, "a host state [is] to make no negative differentiation
between foreign and national investors when enacting and applying its
rules and regulations .... ,,170 Some treaties contemplate national treat-
ment as treatment "no less favorable" than treatment afforded to nation-
als. 17 1 The idea behind this understanding of the principle is that
international law might afford investors greater protection than a host
country provides to its own nationals. 17 2 By using the term "no less
favorable," a country implicitly acknowledges that national treatment does
not necessarily entail treating an investor in the same manner as a
national, in the event that such treatment falls below the international min-
imum standard. 173 Other treaties contemplate national treatment as apply-
ing only when the foreign and domestic investors are in "like
circumstances."'174 However, "tribunals have been cautio[us] not to con-
strue the basis of comparison for the applicability of the national treatment
standard too narrowly."' 175
B. Dispute Resolution
Although the standards of protection discussed above endeavor to pro-
vide agreed-upon standards of treatment to foreign states and their citizens'
investments, parties occasionally have to deal with a breach of those stan-
dards. In the event that an investor is not granted the standards of protec-
tion afforded by treaty, an investor should have some means of recourse
against the breaching host country. In accordance with "traditional inter-
national law, investors did not have direct access to international remedies
to pursue claims against foreign states for violation of their rights."'
1 76
Instead, investors were forced to rely on diplomatic action taken on their
behalf. 177 However, since diplomatic action generally politicizes disputes,
an arguably better dispute resolution mechanism would empower investors
168. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 166, at 186.
169. See id. at 178.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 178-79; see SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 71.
175. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 166, at 180.
176. Id. at 211.
177. Id.
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to bring claims directly against an offending host state. 178 Treaties now
typically provide for dispute resolution by way of investor-state
arbitration. 179
One of the main advantages of providing for investor-state arbitration
is that it signals that, in the event of a dispute arising out of contract with a
host state, an investor has recourse to an independent dispute settlement
mechanism. 180 The International Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID) was
created in order to establish an independent dispute resolution process. 181
A host state's ratification of the ICSID signals that it has agreed to resolve
disputes upon consent. 18 2 However, "Article 26 of the ICSID Convention
makes it clear that a state may make the exhaustion of local remedies a
condition of consent to arbitration."'18 3 In such circumstances, a state may
make a foreign investor first resort to domestic legal processes.
In the late 1800s, a doctrine that required foreign investors to submit
disputes to local courts found favor among several Latin American coun-
tries. 18 4 Known as the "Calvo doctrine" -named for Argentine jurist Car-
los Calvo-this doctrine required foreign investors to "exhaust local
remedies prior to resorting to international arbitration or international
adjudication."'185 The Calvo doctrine essentially puts foreign investors at
the mercy of domestic courts applying domestic laws. 18 6 Latin America's
flirtation with the Calvo doctrine may not be completely over. Although
there are signs indicating that some Latin American countries are increas-
ingly wary of the ICSID and may favor domestic dispute mechanisms, 187
the region may recognize that foreign investors are unlikely to continue
investing in South American energy if the region lacks an independent dis-
pute resolution mechanism. 18 8
178. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 97.
179. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 166, at 213-14.
180. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 30.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 31.
183. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 166, at 215.
184. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 14-15.
185. Id. at 14.
186. See Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims under the 2004 Model U.S. BIT: A
Challenge for State Police Powers?, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 935, 936 n.2 (2010) (citations
omitted).
187. See Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16
LAw & Bus. REv. AM. 409, 410 (2010) ("The most critical examples of recent hostility
against ICSID in Latin America are found in the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Vene-
zuela. In fact, in 2007 Bolivia became the first country ever to denounce the Washington
Convention, thus formally withdrawing from ICSID. Ecuador followed Bolivia's path
and became the second country to denounce the Washington Convention, and the Vene-
zuelan Supreme Court issued an opinion limiting the reach of the country's consent to
submit to the Centre's jurisdiction.").
188. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 31 ("[ICSID] states would.., stand a better chance
of attracting foreign investment from those investors wary of losing their investment
through expropriation, nationalisation or other government actions.").
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III. The Energy Charter Treaty in a Nutshell
One of the unique aspects of the European Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) is that it is a sector-specific investment treaty. 18 9 In other words,
European community states developed the ECT in order to facilitate trade
and investment in the energy sector. 190 After the fall of the former Soviet
Union, there was some concern that Europe might face energy supply
problems as the former Soviet bloc integrated into the greater European
community.' 9 ' In June 1990, Ruud Lubbers, the former Prime Minister of
the Netherlands, brought the idea of a "European Energy Community" to a
European Council meeting. 1 92 After several years of negotiation, this idea
developed into the Energy Charter Treaty, which "was signed in Lisbon on
December 17, 1994 by 49 States and the European Community."'
1 93
Another unique aspect of the ECT is its multilateral nature.' 9 4 The
ECT has fifty-one member states, 195 including the twenty-seven member
states of the European Union (EU), and twenty-four non-EU states. 1 96
Indeed, the ECT was adopted as a multilateral treaty precisely because
"multilateral rules can provide a more balanced and efficient framework for
international cooperation than is offered by bilateral agreements alone or
by non-legislative instruments."'1 9 7 Accordingly, the ECT endeavors to pro-
vide a common "legal framework in order to promote long-term coopera-
tion in the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual
benefits."198
The ECT deals with four aspects of the energy sector: transit, environ-
ment, trade, and investment. 199 While a comprehensive analysis of the
ECT may offer additional specific model provisions for a regional energy
treaty, the parts of the ECT dealing with transit, trade, and the environment
are outside the scope of this Note. Instead, some of the key investment
provisions included in Parts III and V of the ECT will be outlined in order
to highlight some of the ECT's international investment protection
aspects. 20 0 The provisions of Parts III and V of the ECT can serve as a
model for a South American regional energy investment treaty, which the
region's countries might alter in order to better serve their interests.
189. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 166, at 27.
190. Graham Coop, Energy Charter Treaty and the European Union: Is Conflict Inevita-
ble?, 27 No. 3 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 404, 415 (2009).
191. See OMEAu, supra note 64, at 51.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 51-52.
194. See id. at 51 n.62.
195. About the ECT, supra note 46.
196. Coop, supra note 190, at 415-16.
.197. About the ECT, supra note 46.
198. Lucy Reed & Lucy Martinez, The Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview, 14 ILSAJ.
INT'L & COMP. L. 405, 406 (2008) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
199. Danae Azaria, Energy Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 559, 563 (2009).
200. Loukas A. Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the
Energy Charter Treaty, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1301, 1302 (2009).
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A. ECT Standards of Protection
Under Article 10 of the ECT, investors are to be afforded "treat-
ment . . . by a Contracting Party which is no less favourable than that
which it accords to its own Investors or to Investors of any other Con-
tracting Party or any third state, whichever is the most favourable." 20 1 This
provision essentially guarantees investors either national treatment or
most-favored nation treatment.20 2 Most-favored nation treatment ensures
that investors are treated no less favorably than investors from other third
party states.2 03 National treatment affords investors the same protection
that nationals enjoy. 20 4 In the event that third parties are treated better
than nationals, under ECT Article 10, most-favored nation treatment would
apply, giving all investors the level of protection that the most-favored
nation enjoys. 20 5
Additionally, the ECT sets out some very important provisions regard-
ing expropriation. 20 6 Article 13 of the ECT generally prohibits host coun-
tries from nationalizing or expropriating investments. 20 7 However, a host
state may engage in nationalization or expropriation in certain limited cir-
cumstances. 20 8 Expropriation is acceptable when it is "(a) for a purpose
which is in the public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out
under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by the payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation. ' 20 9 Thus, the ECT's provision deal-
ing with expropriation does not prohibit states from expropriating a for-
eign investors' assets outright; it does, however, mandate compensation in
the event of expropriation. 2 10 In this sense, the ECT strikes a balance
between a state's need to exercise its sovereignty and an investor's interest
in having a more predictable and reliable investment environment.
B. Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Investor-State Arbitration
Perhaps one of the most important features of the ECT is its section
governing dispute resolution. Under Article 26, the ECT affords investors
several options with regard to settling disputes arising under the treaty.2 11
Indeed, the dispute settlement clause of the ECT allows investors to seek
resolution in the courts of the host state, in accordance with an agreed-
upon dispute resolution procedure, or in front of an international arbitra-
tion tribunal. 2 12 The last option-international arbitration-is considered
by some to be "the 'most potent' method in the treaty's investment
201. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10(3), 34 1.L.M. 360, 389 (1995) [hereinafter ECT].
202. Reed & Martinez, supra note 198, at 414-15.
203. See supra Part II.A.1.
204. See supra Part II.A.2.
205. See Reed & Martinez, supra note 198, at 414-15.
206. See id. at 407.
207. ECT, supra note 201, art. 13(1).
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id., art. 26(2).
212. Id. art. 26(2)-(3).
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regime." 213
Pursuant to Article 26 of the ECT, member states generally uncondi-
tionally consent to submit disputes to international arbitration, if that is
the means by which an investor wishes to settle a dispute. 2 14 However,
certain member states have qualified their consent to .arbitration in various
ways.2 15 Annex ID of the ECT lists certain member countries that have
agreed to consent to arbitration so long as the investor has not pursued
domestic remedies or submitted to another previously agreed-upon mode
of dispute settlement.2 16 Known as the 'fork in the road provision,' Article
26(3)(b) of the ECT essentially forces investors to make a decision with
regard to the dispute settlement forum. 2 17 If an investor brings a claim
against one of the member countries listed on Annex ID in that host coun-
try's domestic courts or in another agreed-upon forum, that investor may
not double-dip by seeking relief in international arbitration.2 18 Addition-
ally, Article 26(3)(c) provides that none of the member states listed on
Annex IA of the ECT have consented to have claims brought before an inter-
national arbitration tribunal.2 19 Disputes with these states must be
resolved in domestic courts or in another agreed-upon dispute resolution
forum, pursuant to ECT Article 26(2).220 Finally, the ECT expressly recog-
nizes three acceptable international arbitration forums if an investor
chooses to bring a claim before an international arbitration tribunal.
22 1
The three recognized options are the ICSID, 22 2 an arbitration tribunal
"established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law"2 23 (UNCITRAL), or "an arbitral proceed-
ing under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce." 224
IV. A South American Energy Treaty
By adopting a multilateral energy investment treaty similar to the ECT,
the countries of South America may be better able to promote foreign
investment in their respective energy sectors. For one, foreign investors
would have a better understanding of the standards of protection provided
by member states, since such standards of protection are explicitly defined
213. OmAl.u, supra note 64. at 88 n.118 (citation omitted).
214. See ECT, supra note 201, art. 26(3)(a).
215. See id. art. 26(3)(b)-(c).
216. See id. art. 26(3)(b); see also ECT Annex ID (listing, inter alia, the European
Communities, the Russian Federation, and several non-EU member states).
217. See Reed & Martinez, supra notel98, at 423.
218. See id.
219. See ECT, supra note 201, art. 26(3)(c); see also ECT Annex IA (listing Australia,
Hungary and Norway). It should be noted that Canada is a state listed on Annex IA but
Canada has not signed the ECT. ECT Annex IA.
220. See ECT, supra note 201, art. 26(2).
221. See Id. art. 26(4).
222. Id. 26(4)(a).
223. Id. 26(4)(b).
224. Id. 26(4)(c).
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and agreed-upon by party states. 225 Additionally, these standards of pro-
tection would afford foreign investors the better of national or most-
favored-nation treatment. 226 This would signal to foreign investors that
their investments would be protected to the same extent that the invest-
ments of nationals or third parties are protected. 227 Foreign investors
would no longer fear discriminatory treatment by the host country.
Additionally, such a regional energy treaty would provide for agreed-
upon dispute resolution processes.228 A South American energy treaty
could explicitly arrange acceptable modes of dispute settlement so that
investors would know their options in the event that a dispute arises
between them and a host state. Furthermore, as in Annexes ID and IA of
the ECT, South American countries could expressly qualify their consent
to submit to certain dispute resolution forums, strengthening the predict-
ability of their commitments. 229 This would allow the South American
countries some flexibility in their commitments to submit to arbitration,
while also signaling a greater recognition of the need for a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that carries a degree of independence. Ultimately, a
regional energy treaty would promote foreign investment because it would
provide clearer standards of protection, more predictable terms of expro-
priation, and more independent mechanisms under which to settle invest-
ment disputes. 230
However, despite these advantages, there are several obstacles that
stand between the region and an effective multilateral energy treaty. For
one, it may be difficult to adequately coordinate the region. After all, the
ECT grew out of meetings of the European Council. 23 1 Europe already had
a fairly consolidated regional framework in place before discussions of the
ECT commenced. 232 In South America, there are currently several regional
communities established. 233 However, no one international organization
fully and effectively integrates the region. 234 Perhaps the region will be
better able to facilitate international discussions leading to a regional
energy treaty after the creation of UNASUR, but the viability of that
regional body remains to be seen.
Second, there may be signs indicating that some South American
countries are beginning to eschew international arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism, 235 returning to a policy that more heavily favors the
225. Of course, investors would only receive protection under such a treaty if they
were citizens of a party state or otherwise fell within the purview of the treaty's invest-
ment protection provisions.
226. See ECT, supra note 201, art. 10(3).
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. See generally id.
230. See supra Part II.; see also ECT art. 10.
231. See OMALU, supra note 64, at 51.
232. See id.
233. See Introduction (discussing MERCOSUR and the Andean Community).
234. See UNIV RSIA, supra note 6 (noting the dubious potential for energy integration
in South America, given the political and economic obstacles that exist in the region).
235. See Vincentelli, supra note 187, at 454.
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Calvo doctrine with regard to international investment disputes. 236 Bolivia
renounced the ICSID as a dispute settlement forum, and formally withdrew
from it in 2007.237 Ecuador quickly followed Bolivia's lead, and Venezuela
has recently limited its relationship with the ICSID. 2 38 Although these
actions may be interpreted as indicating an increased reluctance to submit
to international dispute mechanisms, it may be possible for the region to
create its own international arbitration system in a character more in tune
with the region's political dynamics. Perhaps such an individualized arbi-
tration mechanism might entail a panel of one or two regional arbitrators
on a panel along with a sufficient number of extra-regional arbitrators.
Additionally, a regional arbitration center might be created that also
adopts an appellate review system. An appellate system might be desirable
to member states insofar as it would perceivably reduce the power of any
single panel of arbitrators. Although some have argued that an appellate
mechanism might create several practical problems for the ICSID,2 3 9 it may
be possible to create a regional arbitration center that has such an appellate
system in place. Ultimately, these are issues for the region to decide, but
they may be issues worth further analysis and intra-regional discussion.
Third, some of the South American countries may have strained politi-
cal relationships with one another and with extra-continental nations.240
This may be problematic insofar as some South American countries do not
wish to offer certain foreign investors most-favored-nation treatment or
national treatment. These countries may indeed wish to discriminate
against certain countries and their investors. It is most likely in these
countries' best interests to reconcile their political differences with their
interest in promoting greater economic development by way of increased
foreign investment. After all, "non-discrimination has ... been regarded as
the fundamental principle of liberalism."' 24 1 However, it may instead be
more realistic for the South American nations to adjust the definition of
"investment" under a regional energy treaty, perhaps excluding certain
kinds of investments from the protection of the treaty. The energy treaty
would thereby discriminate against certain investments rather than certain
investors. In this way, the South American region may avail itself of the
benefits of a multilateral energy investment treaty while accounting for the
particular interests and needs of the region.
236. See SUBEDI, supra note 157, at 191.
237. Vincentelli, supra note 187, at 410.
238. See id.
239. August Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER 894, 910
(Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
240. See Venezuela 'to Break Off Diplomatic Relations with Colombia', THE TELEGRAPH,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/6090910/Vene-
zuela-to-break-off-diplomatic-relations-with-Colombia.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011)
(discussing Venezuela's criticism of Colombian and U.S. policy); but see Colombia and
Venezuela Restore Diplomatic Relations, BBC, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-latin-america-10926003 (discussing Venezuela's intention to rekindle diplo-
matic relations with Colombia).
241. OMALU, supra note 64, at 91.
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Conclusion
South America, although resource-rich, is not fully maximizing the
potential of its energy supplies. 2 4 2 Several factors contribute to the conti-
nent's under-production, but a primary concern is the region's lack of an
integrated and effective investment protection system.24 3 Indeed, foreign
investors may be increasingly wary of investing in the region's energy sec-
tors, since some of the more resource-rich states-including Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Ecuador-have recently engaged in activities that indicate an
increasing attitude of resource nationalism.2 44 As a result, foreign inves-
tors may view the region's energy projects as unduly risky.
The ECT was created in an effort to facilitate investment in the Euro-
pean community after the fall of the Soviet Union.24 5 The European states
united to adopt a multilateral energy treaty that provides for the protection
of foreign investments in the energy sector. 24 6 By providing member states
and their investors certain standards of protection and mechanisms to
resolve disputes, the ECT creates a more predictable legal framework for
international investments.
Although the ECT may not be wholly transportable to South America,
many of its precepts could inform the creation of a South American
regional energy treaty. With proper coordination and consideration of
local interests, the region may be able to agree on the terms of a multilat-
eral investment treaty that will provide greater clarity for investors.
Although such a treaty may be many years from fruition, it is important for
the region to begin considering a comprehensive plan to promote energy
investment.
242. See Hanson, supra note 2.
243. See supra Introduction.
244. See supra Part I.
245. See OMALU, supra note 64, at 51.
246. See supra Part III.
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